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INTRODUCTION 
The regulation and exercise of administrative detention have been 
among the most problematic areas in the process of building a Chinese 
justice system in the reform era. In contrast to the Chinese criminal justice 
system, which was designed to serve the purpose of crime control and to 
punish criminality,
1
 the Chinese administrative justice system is largely 
designed to deal with minor offenders—those who commit “deviant” acts, 
such as prostitution, drug abuse and public order offences. These offenders 
are handled by the administrative apparatus through administrative 
procedures and sanctioned by administrative regulations.
2
 In the structure 
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1
 CHEN RUIHUA, WENTI YU ZHUYI ZHIJIAN [BETWEEN PROBLEMS AND 
PRINCIPLES] 166-209 (2d ed., 2008)  
2
 The administrative justice system refers to the regulatory framework in which 
the Chinese authorities, particularly the police, incarcerate minor offenders without trial. 
This is done under a variety of administrative detentions to maintain public order and 
social and political stability. For a detailed discussion of the Chinese administrative 
justice system, see Li Enshen, Chinese Administrative Justice System: Its Malpractice 
and Possible Reform, 4 FRONTIERS OF LAW IN CHINA 548, 548-579 (2010). 
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of this framework, administrative detention is the most effective means 
frequently used by the authorities to target minor offenders. Due to its 
wide scope, administrative offenses are divided into four specific 
punishments: public order detention,
3
 detention for education,
4
 coercive 
drug rehabilitation,
5
 and reeducation through labour.
6
 While public order 
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 See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhi’an Guanli Chufa Fa (中华人民共和国
治安管理处罚法) [PRC Public Order Administrative Punishment Law] (promulgated by 
the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 28, 2005, effective Mar. 1, 2006), 
art. XVI, available at http://www.gov.cn (last visited Mar. 1, 2012) [hereinafter POAPL]. 
Public Order Detention is the most lenient administrative detention prescribed under the 
PRC Security Administrative Punishment Law, targeting minor offenders, drug addicts 
and prostitutes. Under Article XVI, the maximum detention period is twenty days for a 
number of the covered offenses.   
4
 Detention for Education is an administrative detention recognized by three 
underlying legislative documents aimed at prostitutes and their clients. See Maiyin 
Piaochang Renyuan Shourong Jiaoyu Banfa (卖淫嫖娼人员收容教育办法) [Measures 
for Detention for Education of Prostitutes and Clients of Prostitutes] (promulgated by the 
State Council, Sept. 4, 1993, effective Sept. 4, 1993), art. IX, available at 
http://www.law-lib.com (last visited Mar. 1, 2012); Guanyu Yange Zhixing Quanguo 
Renda Changweihui ‘Guanyu Yanjin Maiyin Piaochang de Jueding’ (严格执行全国人大
常委会‘关于严禁卖淫嫖娼的决定’) [Notice on Implementing the NCPSC ‘Decision on 
Strictly Prohibiting Prostitution and Using Prostitutes’] (promulgated by the Ministry of 
Pub. Sec., Nov. 23, 1991, effective Nov. 23, 1991), available at http://www.kdgaj.gov.cn 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2012); Guanyu Yanjin Maiyin Piaochang de Jueding (关于严谨卖淫
嫖娼的决定 ) [Decision on Strictly Prohibiting Prostitution and Using Prostitutes] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 4, 1991, effective Sept. 
4, 1991), art. V, available at http://www.lawinfochina.com (last visited Mar. 1, 2012). 
5
 Coercive Drug Rehabilitation is the administrative custodial measure deployed 
to help drug users detoxify during incarceration. Its use is justified by three drug-related 
normative directives. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jindu Fa (中华人民共和国禁毒
法) [PRC Anti-Drug Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Dec. 29, 2007, effective June 1, 2008), art. XXXIII, available at 
http://www.gov.cn (last visited Mar. 1, 2012); Qiangzhi Jiedu Banfa (强制解毒办法) 
[Measures on Coercive Drug Rehabilitation] (promulgated by the State Council, Jan. 12, 
1995, effective Jan. 12, 1995), available at http://gkml.liyang.gov.cn (last visited Mar. 1, 
2012); Guanyu Jindu de Jueding (关于禁毒的决定) [Decision on the Prohibition of 
Drugs] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 28, 1990, 
effective Dec. 28. 1990), art. VIII, available at http:www.china.com.cn (P.R.C.). 
6
 Reeducation through Labour, which offers one to three years of incarceration 
with a possible one-year extension, is the most severe administrative detention in China 
today. Reeducation through labour targets socially harmful acts and minor offenses, 
including drug addiction and prostitution. See Guowuyuan guanyu laodong jiaoyang 
wenti de jueding ( 国务院关于劳动教养问题的决定 ) [Temporary Methods on 
Reeducation through Labor] (promulgated by the State Council, Jan. 21, 1982, effective 
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detention applies to those who commit public order offences with minimal 
harms to society, the three remaining punishments are mainly employed to 
handle prostitutes, drug users, and those who commit serious 
administrative offences when public order penalties are too lenient and 
criminal punishments are too harsh.  
Many legal scholars and human rights activists and organizations 
have recommended that the Chinese authorities eliminate all 
administrative detention due to its shaky legal basis for depriving 
offenders’ freedom as well as the blatant violation of detainees’ human 
rights during incarceration.
7
 The maladministration of these custodial 
measures are diverse, including the arbitrary deprivation of offenders’ 
liberty,
8
 the use of administrative detention to bypass the procedural 
requirements of the Criminal Procedure Law,
9
 and the denial of offenders’ 
rights to seek redress from the courts.
10
 In respect to the alternatives, most 
                                                                                                                         
Jan. 21, 1982), available at http://www.xgsfj.gov.cn (last visited Mar. 1, 2012); Guanyu 
Gongbu ‘Guowuyuan Guanyu Laodong Jiaoyang de Buchong Jueding’ (关于公布‘国务
院关于劳动教养的补充决定) [Notice Promulgating the ‘Supplementary Regulations of 
the State Council on Re-education through Labor’] (promulgated by the State Council, 
Dec. 5, 1979, effective Dec. 5, 1979), art. III, available at http://zfhfrx.shaanxi.gov.cn 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2012); Guowuyuan Guanyu Laodong Jiaoyang Wenti de Jueding (国
务院关于劳动教养问题的决定) [Decision of the State Council on the Question of Re-
education through Labor] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Aug. 3, 1957, effective Aug. 3, 1957), art. II, available at 
http://ga.chinawuxi.gov.cn (last visited Mar. 1, 2012). 
7
 See generally AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, CHINA, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT 
CRIME: ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION (1991); CHINA HUMAN RIGHTS STRATEGY STUDY 
GROUP, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA, PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA 8-11 (2001), 
available at http://hrichina.org/public/PDFs/Reports/HRIC-Strategy.pdf; HUMAN RIGHTS 
IN CHINA, REEDUCATION THROUGH LABOR (RTL): A SUMMARY OF REGULATORY ISSUES 
AND CONCERNS 3-5 (2001), available at http://hrichina.org/public/PDFs/Reports/HRIC-
RTL.pdf; Qu Xuewu, Baoan Chufen he Xingfa Gaige [Policing Measures and Chinese 
Criminal Law Reform], 5 FAXUE YANJIU [CHINESE J. L.] 55, 56-68 (1996); Shen Fujun, 
Guanyu Feichu Laodong Jiaoyang Zhidu de Sikao [The Thinking of Abolishing 
Reeducation Through Labor], 7 FAXUE [LEGAL SCI.] 17-19 (1999); Peng Zehu, Shourong 
Jiaoyu Weifaxing Yanjiu [The Study of Illegality of Detention for Education], 11 XINAN 
MINGZU XUEYUANXUEBAO [J. SW. INST. NAT’LS] 72, 72-74 (2002). 
8
 AMENESTY INTERNATIONAL, CHINA: NO ONE IS SAFE: POLITICAL REPRESSION 
& ABUSE OF POWER IN THE 1990’S 3 (1996), available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA17/027/1991/en/6ec5f3dd-f941-11dd-92e7-
c59f81373cf2/asa170271991en.pdf.  
9
 See generally LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS: CHINA’S CRIMINAL PROCESS AND VIOLATIONS OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS (1993). 
10
 Dong Baigao, Woguo Sifa Jiguan Duochong Zhineng Gaige zhi Sikao 
[Thoughts on Reforming the Multiple Responsibilities System of China’s Judicial Organs], 
4 ZHONGGUO FAXUE [CHINA LEGAL SCI.] 24, 24-26 (1997). 
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arguments call for an incorporation of administrative minor offences into 
the formal criminal justice system.
11
 By doing so, it is said that defaulters 
that are presently subjected to administrative detention would have 
procedural protections set out under the Criminal Procedure Law, and the 
legal foundation for depriving citizens’ liberties would be justified by the 
Criminal Procedure Law.
12
  
There are, however, also opposing views. Randall Peerenboom, an 
influential Chinese law expert, claims that there are a number of good 
reasons for retaining administrative detention. The most compelling of 
these is that “eliminating administrative detentions and subjecting minor 
offenders to criminal sanctions will push them into the harsh and 
decidedly unfriendly penal system, force them to live with hardened 
criminals, and result in their being forever stigmatized as convicts.”13 This 
perception is echoed by another scholar of Chinese law, who perceives 
Chinese administrative detention as the product of the “second line of 
defense” of police administrative powers.14 The author argues that the use 
of police administrative powers is more formal and effective than the “first 
line of defense” in preventing bad conduct from further deteriorating into 
crime.
15
 In addition, administrative detention has been heavily relied upon 
and used as an adjunct to enforcement of the criminal law
16
 during the 
“Strike Hard” campaigns that have been periodically launched across 
China since the 1980s.
17
 Therefore, the author believes that “the police 
                                                 
11
 See generally Zhang Shaoyan, Lun Laodong Jiaoyang Lifa de Jige Jichuxing 
Wenti—Jianli Woguo Qingzui Chufa Zhidu de Lilun Chuangxin [The Basic Issues of 
Legalizing Re-education through Labour—The Theoretical Innovation of Establishing 
Minor Punishments in China], 2 FAXUE PINGLUN [L. REV.] 23, 23-30 (2003); Chu Kuizhi, 
Yilun Laodong Jiaoyang Zhidu Gaige [The Discussion of Re-education through Labour 
Reform], 5 ZHONGGUO SIFA [JUST. CHINA] 27, 27-29 (2005).  
12
 Zhang, supra note 11, at 29.  
13
 Randall Peerenboom, Out of the Pan and Into the Fire: Well-Intentioned but 
Misguided Recommendations to Eliminate All Forms of Administrative Detention in 
China, 98 (3) NW. U. L. REV. 991, 993-94 (2004). Apart from the likely harsher penalties, 
minor offences may receive under the criminal justice system, the author also extensively 
analyses the existing legal and philosophical shortcomings of the Chinese criminal justice 
system, which leads to the conclusion that the criminalization of minor offences will lead 
to a worse situation than the administrative justice system.    
14
 SARAH BIDDULPH, LEGAL REFORM AND ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION POWERS 
IN CHINA 120-22 (2007). 
15
 Id. In her book, the author considers regulation and education based on the 
community organization and mass-line policing the “first line of defense” serving the 
prevention of criminality in China.  When this first line of defense fails, the coercive 
police powers that serve as the “second line of defense” take over and function as the 
stiffer measures to prevent criminality. 
16
 Id. at 123-48. 
17
 For detailed accounts of Chinese ‘Hard Strike’ policies and practices, see 
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administrative detention powers in China will continue to form an integral 
and distinctive part of social order, which facilitates flexibility in dealing 
with changing problems of social order.”18  
In response to the advocacy for retaining administrative detentions, 
the legalization and rationalization of their use has elicited a broad range 
of proposals. Some legal professionals take the view that administrative 
detention is in urgent need of a legal foundation.
19
 They argue that most 
forms of administrative detention governed either by administrative 
regulations passed by the State Council or by departmental directives fail 
to comply with the stipulation of the Administrative Punishment Law.
20
 
Therefore, a specific law is needed to legitimize the deprivation of the 
individual’s liberty under administrative detention and formalize practical 
implementation.
21
 However, given the reality that the drafting of a 
reeducation through labour law is cumbersome and time-consuming, some 
experts suggest an alternative idea that the administrative detention power 
can also be transferred from the police to the judiciary in order to meet the 
requirements of impartiality and neutrality.
22
 More interestingly, a number 
                                                                                                                         
HAROLD TANNER, STRIKE HARD! ANTI-CRIME CAMPAIGNS AND CHINESE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 1979-1985 (1999); Murray Scott Tanner, State Coercion and the Balance of Awe: 
The 1983-1986 ‘Stern Blows’ Anti-Crime Campaign, 44 CHINA J. 93, 93-125 (2000); Bin 
Liang, Severe Strike Campaign in Transitional China, 33 J. CRIM. JUST. 387, 387-99 
(2005). 
18
 Sarah Biddulph, The Production of Legal Norms: A Case Study of 
Administrative Detention in China, 20 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 217, 276 (2004). 
19
 Chen Xinliang, Zhongguo Laodong Jiaoyang Zhidu Yanjiu—Yi Xingshi Fazhi 
wei Shijiao [Research on Chinese Reeducation Through Labor—From the Perspective of 
Rule of Criminal Justice], 13 ZHONGWAI FAXUE [PEKING U. L J.] 670 (2001); Chen 
Zexian, Zhongguo Laodong Jiaoyang Zhidu Jiqi Gaige [Chinese Reeducation Through 
Labor System and Its Reform], 129 HUANGQUI FALÜ PINLUN [GLOBAL L. REV.] 400 
(2003); Peng Zehu, Shourong Jiaoyu Weifaxing Yanjiu [The Study on Unlawfulness of 
Detention for Education], 11 XINAN MINZU XUEYUAN XUEBAO [J. SW. U. FOR 
NATIONALITIES] 72 (2002).  
20
 Art. IX of the Administrative Punishment Law says: “All deprivations of 
personal freedom under administrative punishments should be based on law.” See 
Peerenboom, supra note 13, at 1043-44. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng 
Chufafa (中华人民共和国行政处罚法) [The Administrative Punishment Law of the 
People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Mar. 17, 1996, effective Mar. 17. 1996), available at http://www.law-
lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=307 (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).  
21
 See generally WANG ZHONGFAN, ZHONGGUO SHEHUI ZHIAN ZONGHE ZHILI DE 
LILUN YU SHIJIAN [THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COMPREHENSIVE MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC 
ORDER IN CHINA] 280 (1992); Zhang Shaoyan, Guanyu Laodong Jiaoyang Lifa de Jichu 
Wenti Sikao [The Thinking of Basic Issues of Legislating the Re-education through 
Labour], 3 FAXUE [LEGAL SCI.] 40, 40-44 (2001).   
22
 Chu Kuizhi, Lun Jiaoyang Chuyu de Helixing [The Rationality of Re-
education Treatment], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL DAILY], June 3, 1999, at 6. 
2012] Li 169  
of Chinese scholars are inclined to borrow notions from European Security 
Defence Punishment to regulate administrative detention as a whole.
23
 
They believe that Chinese minor offenders subjected to administrative 
detention share the same characteristics of those in the security defense 
system, and thus need to be treated under a system other than 
administrative incarceration or criminal sanctions.
24
 
Nevertheless, the ideas of both the retention and reform of 
administrative detention only focus on the justification of the practice but 
largely overlook its practical effectiveness. By examining the attributes 
and recidivism rates of administrative offenders, especially drug addicts 
and prostitutes, it becomes clear that the imposition of administrative 
detention does not effectively eradicate drug addiction or prostitution, or 
correct people’s socially harmful behaviors. 25  Rather, incarceration of 
administrative offenders alienates them from their society, community, and 
family, thereby hampering the social forces that may help them suspend 
their misbehavior. On the other hand, education, rehabilitation, and 
persuasion are the most effective methods for reducing recidivism.
26
 
Therefore, my previous study suggests that whereas administrative 
detention represents a punishment-oriented rhetoric, a community-based 
correctional system is more likely to prevent offending behavior.
27
 
Whether or not this hypothesis is theoretically feasible, the 
argument raises some immediate questions as to the practicality of placing 
administrative offenders into a community-based correction system, given 
the uniqueness of the contemporary Chinese legal and social culture. More 
                                                 
23
 See Wang Yanlin, Shilun Jianli Bing Wanshan Juyou Zhongguo Tese de 
Bao’an Chufen Zhidu [Tentative Discussion of Establishing and Perfecting Security 
Defense Punishment with Chinese Particularities], 5 XINGDAI FAXUE [MOD. L. SCI.] 109, 
109-11 (1996); Fang Qingxia, Goujian Woguo Wanzheng de Bao’an Chufen Zhidu de 
Shexiang [Envisaging Constructing China’s Integrated Security Defense Punishment 
System], 20 HEIBEI FAXUE [HEIBEI L. SCI.] 13, 13-7 (2002); Chen Kang, Woguo Bao’an 
Chufen Lifahua de Genju [The Basis of Legislation of Security Defense Punishment in 
China], 5 HEIBEI FAXUE [HEIBEI L. SCI.] 91, 93 (2004). 
24
 Fang, supra note 23, at 17; Chen, supra note 23, at 97. 
25
 For a detailed discussion, see Li Enshen, Prisonization or Socialization? 
Social Factors Associated with Chinese Administrative Offenses, 27 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. 
J. 213, 213-59 (2010). 
26
 For example, the Chinese community correctional system focuses mainly on 
education and rehabilitation of minor criminals to help them reenter the society. 
According to one national statistical survey conducted on 50,083 offenders who received 
community corrections in eighteen Chinese cities and provinces in the year of 2005, the 
recidivism rate is around one percent during the period 2004-2005. See Li Bing, 
Zhongguo Shequ Jiaozheng Shidian [Summary of Community Correctional Experimental 
Work in China], in SHEQU JIAOZHENG—2006 BEIJING GUOJI LUNTAN [COMMUNITY 
CORRECTION—2006 BEIJING INTERNATIONAL FORUM] 4 (Beijing Justice Bureau ed. 
2006) 
27
 Li, supra note 25, at 213-59. 
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specifically, is the Chinese community correction system now 
comprehensive and mature enough to incorporate minor offenders into its 
jurisdiction? Are social resources and forces in the Chinese neighborhood 
adequate to provide what administrative offenders need for their 
rehabilitation and remolding? Is the Chinese community culture receptive 
enough to embrace prostitutes and drug abusers who might still pose a 
threat to the safety of the community? More importantly, is the full 
enforcement of this system contradictory with any legal or institutional 
mechanisms in force? 
This article examines the legal, institutional, and philosophical 
impediments that Chinese community corrections may have to face in the 
process of incorporating administrative offenders into its system. It argues 
that while the insufficient legal justification for community corrections 
serves as a general factor of marginalizing it in the Chinese penal system, 
more disturbing factors lie outside the scope of legality. Specifically, by 
reviewing the requisites of community correctional programs, this article 
concludes that inconsistency with the Hukou system, inadequacies of 
social correctional resources, and lack of public support greatly impede 
the effectuation of this reform in contemporary China.    
 
I. COMMUNITY CORRECTION: A SUBSTITUTE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE 
DETENTION 
 
The Chinese administrative justice system has developed alongside 
the Chinese criminal justice system since the founding of the People’s 
Republic of China.
28
 Although some scholars call for integration of 
criminal justice system with administrative justice system, due mainly to 
the difficulty of distinguishing the two systems,
29
 more legal professionals 
are inclined to retain this two-tier legal system. They hold the view that, 
unlike criminal procedure, whose administration of justice is slow and 
                                                 
28
 For detailed discussions of the development and practice of Chinese criminal 
justice system, see generally JEROME ALAN COHEN, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1949-1963: AN INTRODUCTION (1968); SHAO-CHUAN 
LENG & HUNGDAH CHUI, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN POST-MAO CHINA: ANALYSIS AND 
DOCUMENTS (1985); STANLEY LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA 
AFTER MAO 138-73 (1999); CHEN JIANFU, CHINESE LAW: CONTEXT AND 
TRANSFORMATION 299-322 (2008); Daniel C. Turack, The New Chinese Criminal Justice 
System, 49 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 49, 49-72 (1999). 
29
 Zhang Kai & Zhang Jianbin, Zhi’an Guanli Chufa Fa yu Xingfa Fatiao 
Chongtu Wenti Tanxi [Exploring the Conflicts between the Public Order Administrative 
Punishment Law and the Criminal Law], 12 FAXUE ZAZHI [L. SCI. MAG.] 108, 108-11 
(2009); Le Jungang, Zhi’an Chufa de Xingfahua—Chonggou Woguo Zhi’an Chufa Zhidu 
de Yizhong Silu [Penalization of Public Order Offence—A Thought to Reconstruct 
China’s Public Order Punishment System], 5 GUANGXI ZHENGFA GUANLI GANBU 
XUEYAN XUEBAO [J. GUANGXI ADMIN. CADRE INST. POL. & L.] 98, 98-102 (2009). 
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costly, the administrative justice system is more flexible and efficient, 
allowing it to respond more quickly to social danger.
30
 This quicker 
response in turn leads to heightened authority and deterrence.
31
 As 
economic reform progresses, the primacy of social stability and order has 
been repeatedly articulated, and the authorities have underscored the 
centrality of stability to the development of the nation’s economy. 32 
Realization of this goal of stability and order, however, has become 
increasingly complex and difficult to achieve. In recent years, the number 
of drug users has dramatically risen among different classes of Chinese 
people,
33
 while prostitution has gradually become a stable profession for 
urban and rural women who lack income resources and education. 
Socially disruptive conduct that takes the form of mass petitions and 
protests or conduct considered to be anti-state has increased 
considerably.
34
 Mass incidents organized to confront abuses of the state’s 
powers are widely reported.
35
  
Functionally, the Chinese government tends to utilize 
administrative detention as the “second line of defense” in crime 
prevention and reintegration of offenders into society.
36
 The administrative 
justice system requires that detainees receive moral and legal education, 
conduct productive labour, and learn vocational skills to facilitate their 
                                                 
30
 Biddulph, supra note 18, at 276-77 (2003); Wang Lirong, Laodong Jiaoyang 
Zhixing yu Guanli de Ruogan Wenti [Several Issues on the Enforcement and Management 
of Reeducation Through Labour], 6 FAXUE [LEGAL SCI.] 23 (2001). 
31
 Dai Yuzhong & Liu Mingxiang, FANZUI YU XINGZHENG WEIFA XINGWEI DE 
JIEXIAN JI CHENGFA JIZHI DE XIETIAO [THE BOUNDARIES BETWEEN CRIME AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSE AND COORDINATION OF THE PUNISHMENT SYSTEM] 26 (2008); 
Feng Jiangju, Xingzheng Weifa yu Fanzui de Jiexian [The Borderline Between 
Administrative Offence and Crime—Discussion on the Vague Distinction Between 
Administrative and Criminal Power], 1 XINGZHENG FAXUE YANJIU [ADMIN. L. REV.] 66 
(2009).  
32
 Sarah Biddulph, Prospects for Procedural Justice in Reforms to Public Order 
Regulations in China, 10 AUS. J. ASIAN L. 50 (2008). 
33
 In 2001, there were 900,000 registered drug addicts, increasing by forty 
percent compared to 540,000 in 1995. See He Zhixiong, Luo Weidao, Qiu Zhiwen & Qiu 
Hongzhong, Dui Xidu Yuanyin de Diaocha yu Fenxi [The Survey and Analysis of the 
Cause of Drug Abuse], 10 ZHONGGUO YAOWU LANYONG FANGZHI ZAZHI [CHINESE J. OF 
DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION & TREATMENT] 20 (2004). 
34
 Dali L. Yang, Economic Transformation and Its Political Discontents in 
China: Authoritarianism, Unequal Growth, and the Dilemmas of Political Development, 
9 ANN. REV. POLITICAL SCI. 152 (2006). 
35
 Biddulph, supra note 32, at 51. 
36
 ZHI’AN GUAN LI CHU FA TIAO LI JIAO CHENG [TEACHING MATERIALS ON THE 
SECURITY ADMINISTRATIVE PUNISHMENT REGULATIONS] 3 (Pingshan Zhu ed., 1991); 
ZHONGGUO XIAN JIE DUAN FAN ZUI WEN TI YAN JIU [THE STUDY OF CRIME PROBLEMS IN 
CHINA’S NEW ERA] 239 (Lei Yu ed., 1993). 
172 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal [Vol. 13:2 
reentry into society.
37
 Despite these stated objectives, administrative 
detention seldom serves an educative and corrective purpose.
38
 Rather, the 
government employs administrative detention largely as punitive 
instruments for maintaining social order
39
 Recidivism rates of 
administrative offenses affirm the ineffectiveness of administrative 
detention in preventing misconduct. For example, estimates based on 
statistical surveys from the 1990s place prostitute recidivism following 
release from detention for education or reeducation through labour 
between fifty to sixty percent nationwide.
40
 According to one study, “a 
large number of prostitutes go straight back to the game once completing 
their compulsory education at reformatories.”41 Likewise, the recidivism 
of drug addicts is troubling. One recent report revealed that an estimated 
sixty to ninety-five percent of detoxicated patients in China relapse within 
one year.
42
  
Western recidivist literature shows that the recidivism is affected 
by variables ranging from personal characteristics to cultural and social 
conditions.
43
 Among these factors, social capital is one of the most 
                                                 
37
 Victor N. Shaw, Productive Labor and Thought Reform in Chinese 
Corrections: A Historical and Comparative Analysis, 78 PRISON J. 186, 194-95 (1998). 
38
 Reviewing the characteristics of administrative detention reveals that this 
instrument is very similar to criminal imprisonment, which is largely carried out in the 
form of mandatory productive labour, which promotes the exploration of the individual’s 
ideological outlook and personal faults that lead to repentance and reform. See Li, supra 
note 25, at 229; Wang, supra note 30, at 23-24; Zhu Tong, Guanyu Dangqian Piaochang 
Xianxiang Jiqi Shourong Jiaoyu Gongzuo de Sikao [The Thinking of the Current 
Phenomenon of Visiting Prostitutes and the Practice of Detention for Education], 1 
GONG’AN LILUN YU SHIJIAN [J. SHANGHAI PUB. SEC. ACAD.] 56 (1995).  
39
 BIDDULPH, supra note 14, at 139. 
40
 Vincent E. Gil, Marco Wang, Allen F. Anderson & Guao Matthew Lin, Plum 
Blossoms and Pheasants: Prostitutes, Prostitution, and Social Control Measures in 
Contemporary China, 38 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 319, 331 
(1994). It is noted that the latest recidivism rates of prostitution are lacking due to the 
secrecy and fluidity of prostitutes in China.    
41
 Allen F. Anderson & Vincent E. Gil, China's Modernization and the Decline 
of Communitarianism: The Control of Sex Crimes and Implications for the Fate of 
Informal Social Control, 14 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 248, 255 (1998). 
42
 Lu Lin & Wang Xi, Drug Addiction in China, 1141 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 
304, 311 (2008).   
43
 There are numerous articles and books concerning criminals’ recidivism and 
its causes. See generally GEORGE K. BROWN, RECIDIVISM: A SOCIAL-LEGAL SURVEY OF 
ITS DEFINITION, INCIDENCE AND TREATMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1947); PETER 
SCHMIDT & ANN DRYDEN WITTE, PREDICTING RECIDIVISM USING SURVIVAL MODELS 
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Little & Claire Goggin, A Meta-Analysis of the Predictors of Adult Offender Recidivism: 
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important theoretical concepts.
44
 Fueled by studies based largely on 
Western experiences, Chinese law specialists have conducted analogous 
studies of recidivism variables in the context of Chinese criminology. 
Their studies indicate that ties with offenders’ families, community 
support, and employment are the most effective factors in preventing 
recidivism.
45
 These factors would also be effective in combating 
recidivism among administrative offenders. Multiple studies demonstrate 
that, other than physiological difficulties, the inadequacy of social and 
familial attention,
46
 unemployment, and lack of education increase the risk 
of relapse among drug addicts.
47
 In the meantime, the high rates of re-
entry into prostitution are attributed to employment, financial hardship, 
and monetary stimulus, which have arisen since the economic reforms 
initiated in the late 1970s.
48
 Administrative detention favors punishment, 
deterrence, and retribution and fails to provide the sources of social capital 
                                                                                                                         
What Works!, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 575 (1996).  
44
 Social capital is defined as resources existing in social structures and 
relationships that facilitate social action. Western criminologists first applied this theory 
to analyze the re-offending of individuals released from prison. Their analytical models 
present two levels of social capital: the resources that exist in interpersonal relationships 
and the social resources that exist in a community. According to this categorization, signs 
of a high level of social capital include mentoring, job networking, marriage and mutual 
support in the community, which are all associated with self-reliant economic 
development without need for government interference. See JAMES S. COLEMAN, 
FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 301-2 (1994); Glenn C. Loury, A Dynamic Theory of 
Racial Income Difference, in WOMEN, MINORITIES AND EMP. DISCRIMINATION 160 
(Phyllis A. Wallace & Annette M. LaMond eds., 1977); Mark H. Smith, Lionel. J. 
Beaulieu & Ann Seraphine, Social Capital, Place of Residence, and College Attendance, 
60 RURAL SOC. 363, 366 (1995); John H. Laub, Daniel S. Nagin & Robert J. Sampson, 
Trajectories of Change in Criminal Offending: Good Marriages and the Desistance 
Process, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 225 (1998). 
45
 Xiaogang Deng, Lening Zhang & Ann Cordilia, Social Control and 
Recidivism in China, 14 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 281, 291-92 (1998). The study 
employed four predictors to examine the effectiveness of an informal social control 
approach in preventing recidivism. These four predictors are previous offenses, the 
rehabilitation rating before release, employment status after release, and whether 
offenders needed a community-based rehabilitation program. 
46
 Wang Xiaohong, Yufang Jieduzhe Fuxi de Xinli Zhiliao [Psychotherapy for 
Preventing Relapse in Drug Rehabilitants], 48 ZHONGGUO LINCHUANG KANGFU 
[CHINESE J. CLINICAL REHAB.] 139 (2005).  
47
 Wang Zhenbao, Fuxi Wenti de Shehuixue Fenxi [Sociological Analysis of 
Relapse], 8 SHEHUI [SOC’Y] 42, 44 (2003). 
48
 Zhu Xudong, Gaige Kaifang Yilai Maiyin Piaochang Wenti Yanjiu Zhongshu 
[Summary of Prostitution Situation after Economic Reform and Openness], 4 GONG’AN 
YANJIU [POLICING STUD.] 93-94 (2001); Xin Ren, Prostitution and Economic 
Modernization in China, 5 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1411, 1424 (1999); Xiao Yi, 
Maiyin Piaochang de Shehui Yuanyin he Kongzhi [Social Reasons and Control of 
Prostitution], 5 DANGDAI FAXUE [CONTEMP. L. REV.] 70-1 (1999). 
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to genuinely help offenders. Community corrections, however, relies 
heavily upon community resources and social forces can produce the 
positive social capital for offenders’ rehabilitation and reentry into society. 
China’s use of community corrections emerged in 2003 with the 
issuance of the Notice on Implementing Experimental Work of Community 
Corrections.
49
 This directive set forth the theoretical basis of community 
corrections, its goals, and its legal obligations.
50
 The Chinese government 
commenced this pilot project in six modern cities and provinces in 2003.
51
 
The tentative use in these regions was intended to explore and advance a 
socialist community corrections model commensurate with the Chinese 
legal system.
52
 In 2004, the Ministry of Justice issued the Provisional 
Measures of Judicial and Administrative Organs in Administering 
Community Correction Work in an attempt to institutionalize the 
implementation of community corrections in the context of the Chinese 
system.
53
 Analogous to their Western counterparts, Chinese community 
corrections programs are designed initially for criminal offenders whose 
crimes are minor and have caused only minimal social harm, as well as 
those who have repented after incarceration and have expressed no further 
intention to harm society.
54
 Although on paper the scope of application of 
community corrections focuses only on specified criminals, community-
based practices are thought to be more suitable to administrative offenders 
because they are able to take use of social resources and forces to provide 
educative and rehabilitative functions to administrative offenders. This 
argument can be particularly demonstrated in the case of Shanghai 
                                                 
49
 This notice was passed by the Supreme Court, the Supreme Procuratorate, the 
Ministry of Public Order, and the Ministry of Justice on July 10, 2003. Guanyu Kaizhan 
Sheque Jiaozheng Shidian Gongzuo de Tongzhi (关于开展社区矫正试点工作的通知) 
[The Notice on Implementing Experimental Work of Community Corrections] (issued by 
the Sup. Ct., the Sup. Procuratorate, the Ministry of Pub. Order and the Ministry of Just., 
effective July 10, 2003), available at http://www.law-
lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=81163 (last visited Mar. 1, 2012) [hereinafter Community 
Corrections Notice]. 
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 Id., art. 1-3; WANG SHUN’AN, SHEQU JIAOZHENG YANJIU [THE STUDY OF 
COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS]  87 (2008). 
51
 The Notice on Implementing Experimental Work of Community Corrections 
set up six tentative areas nationwide for the practice of community corrections, which are 
Beijing,  Tianjin, Shanghai, Jiansu, Zhejiang and Shandong. Community Corrections 
Notice, supra note 49, § 4.  
52
 Wu Yuhua, Shequ Jiaozheng Gongzuo Chutan [Preliminary Exploration of 
Community Corrections], 5 FAXUE ZAZHI [L. SCI. MAG.] 19 (2003).   
53
 WANG, supra note 50. 
54
 Community Corrections Notice , supra note 49, preface. 
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community correction system by looking at how it uses well-designed and 
effective educational programs to successfully re-socialize offenders.
55
 
II. PRACTICAL OBSTACLES: IS PLACING ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENDERS 
UNDER THE COMMUNITY CORRECTION FEASIBLE? 
 
The predicted success in an exceptional case, however, does not 
rule out the question of whether community corrections can be really used 
as a regular measure on administrative offenders regardless of cultural, 
economic, and social diversity in different locales in China. As a new form 
of penal instrument, Chinese community corrections are still at the 
preliminary stage, following the operational patterns of Western 
counterparts. Therefore, its practical implementation shows that this 
system is a far cry from a sophisticated legal mechanism and alienates it 
from the deeply-rooted Chinese legal and social contexts. To understand 
the difficulty of embracing administrative offenders in the current Chinese 
community corrections, one needs to carefully look into the factors that 
impede this proposition in an interdisciplinary perspective, spanning from 
the socio-legal to eco-cultural aspects.  
 
A. Criminal Nature of Community Corrections   
 
Chinese officials commenced their tentative practice of community 
corrections in six prefectures in 2003, and soon expanded its use on a 
national scale in 2005, covering twelve other provinces and cities in 
China’s central and western regions.56 Although community corrections 
are mainly perceived as a Western import, Chinese officials introduced 
this approach into the existing penal system law to build a “Chinese 
socialist democracy and legal system.”57  Thus, community correctional 
programs are implemented in a way that is largely conventional in a 
traditionally Chinese context.
58
 Although some scholars tend to highlight 
the educative and corrective functions of China’s community 
corrections,
59
 the official rhetoric characterizes it as a tool of administering 
                                                 
55
 For a detailed account of how Shanghai’s community correctional system 
maximizes the use of social capital in treating administrative offenders in the community, 
see Li, supra note 25, at 248-54. 
56
 WANG, supra note 53, at 98. 
57
 Community Corrections Notice, supra note 49, art.I. 
58
 In implementing community corrections, authorities focus on preserving 
social order and serving social control in lieu of actually educating and rehabilitating 
offenders in the practice of community correction. Liu Qiang, Zhongwai Sheiqu 
Jiaozheng zhi Qubie yu Sikao [Differences of Community Corrections between China and 
Foreign Countries and Its Thinking], 4 ZHONGGUO SIFA [JUST. CHINA] 58 (2004). 
59
 For example, Professor Kang Shuhua asserts that community corrections is a 
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criminal justice, emphasizing the criminal punishment of people for minor 
offences.
60
 In an attempt to remain consistent with their foreign 
counterparts, the Chinese government has decided to require community 
treatment for probationers, parolees, and those sentenced to control and 
permitted to temporarily serve their sentences outside prison.
61
  
The regulations underlying community correction first 
conceptualize China’s community correction as a non-custodial criminal 
sanction.
62
 The primary task of this instrument is to handle minor criminal 
offenders in lieu of imprisonment and ensure that punishment is smoothly 
implemented through community corrections in light of the Chinese 
Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure Law and other relevant laws.
63
 The 
directives authorize the judicial and administrative organs to direct and 
regulate the practice of community corrections in collaboration with the 
law apparatus, namely police, procuratorates, and courts.
64
 Those who 
create serious consequences through their resistance to community 
management and education should be sent to the police for further 
                                                                                                                         
correctional measure to remold criminals by not isolating them from society and making 
use of social resources. See Kang Shuhua, Shequ Jiaozheng de Lishi, Xianzhuang he 
Zhongda Yiyi [The History, Current Situation and Great Theoretical Values of Community 
Corrections], 5 FAXUE ZAZHI [L. SCI. MAG.] 21-23 (2003); Professor Wang Lirong points 
out that community correction consists of social activities conducted by relevant 
authorities as well as social organizations and volunteers to socialize offenders and help 
them with their daily lives. See Wang Lirong, Cong Sifa Yufang Shijiao Tan Shequ 
Jiaozheng Zhidu de Fazhan Silu [Development of Community-Based Correction System 
from the Perspective of Justice Prevention], 2 SHANGHAI ZHENGFA XUEYUAN XUEBAO [L. 
J. SHANGHAI ADMIN. CADRE INST, POL. & L.] 3-7 (2004).  
60
 Community Corrections Notice, supra note 49, preface. 
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 Control was arguably deployed as a criminal justice measure for mass 
supervision by local communities, schools, and work units. Article 214 of the 1996 
Criminal Procedure Law stipulates that “[a] criminal sentenced to fixed-term 
imprisonment or criminal detention, under either of the following conditions, may be 
permitted to temporarily serve his sentence outside prison: (1) If the criminal is seriously 
ill and needs to be released on parole for medical treatment; or (2) If the criminal is 
pregnant or is breast-feeding her own baby.” Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi 
Susongfa (中华人民共和国刑事诉讼法) [The Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s 
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 17, 1996, effective 
Mar. 17. 1996), art. 214, available at http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=321 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2012).  
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 Community Corrections Notice, supra note 49, preface. 
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 Id., pt. 2-2(1).  
64
 Sifa Xingzheng Jiguan Shequ Jiaozheng Gongzuo Zanxing Banfa (司法行政
机关社区矫正工作暂行办法) [The Provisional Measures of Judicial and Administrative 
Organs in Administering Community Correction] (promulgated by the Dep’t of Just., 
effective May 9, 2004), art. X [hereinafter Provisional Measures] 
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criminal prosecution.
65
 In the meantime, social organizations and 
volunteers are deployed.
66
 These actors are only viewed as supplementary 
forces, however, undertaking the mental, legal, and moral education to 
help offenders become law-abiding citizens after release.
67
      
Such characterizations reveal that China is expecting to adopt 
community corrections as an auxiliary measure to dispense criminal 
justice on specific types of criminal offenders. This perception clearly 
rules out the likelihood of handling administrative offenders under the 
community treatment on a legislative basis. This is because, unlike most 
modern countries where deviant behavior that violates prevailing norms is 
punished by the criminal code, China’s legal context classifies illegal 
conduct into two categories, namely criminality and minor offence. They 
are, in practice, handled separately by the different and independent justice 
systems, which constitute a two-layer social control scheme in the Chinese 
crime prevention strategy. Article thirteen of the Chinese Criminal Law 
1996 (“CCL 1996”) characterizes crimes as all acts that: 
[E]ndanger the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and 
security of the state; split the state; subvert the political 
power of the people’s democratic dictatorship and 
overthrow the socialist system; undermine social and 
economic order; violate property owned by the state or 
property collectively owned by the labo[u]ring masses; 
violate citizens’ privately owned property; infringe upon 
citizens’ rights of the person, democratic rights, and other 
rights; and other acts that endanger society, are crimes if 
according to law they should be criminally punished. 
However, if the circumstances are clearly minor and the 
harm is not great, they are not to be deemed as crimes.
68
  
 
Clearly, criminality appears to be a combination of “criminal 
characterization” and “criminal quantity.” 69  Terminologically, “criminal 
characterization” concerns the nature of illegal conduct, whereas the 
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 Community Corrections Notice, supra note 49, art. 3.   
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 Id., art. IX(4).  
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 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa (中华人民共和国刑法) [The Criminal 
Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., 
effective Mar. 14, 1997), art. XIII, available at http://www.law-
lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=327 (last visited Mar. 1, 2012) [hereinafter CCL 1996].  
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 Chu Kuizhi & Wang Yongle, Zailun Woguo Xingfazhong Fanzui Gainian de 
Dingliang Yingsu [The Further Review of Quantity Factor of the Criminality in Chinese 
Criminal Law], 2 FAXUE YANJIU [CHINESE J. L.] 34, 36 (2000). 
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“criminal quantity” refers to the degree of severity of a particular act.70 
Many Chinese scholars thus characterize the assessment of criminal 
quantity as the vital factor in determining whether the offender should be 
sanctioned criminally or administratively.
71
 Unlike the specified 
stipulation of a criminal act, minor offences lack a clear definition in the 
CCL 1996.
72
 Instead, the Public Order Administration Punishments Law 
of the People’s Republic of China (“POAPL”) sets forth several categories 
of infringement that are considered as minor offences.
73
 
 
With regard to an act of disrupting public order, 
encroaching upon the right of the person, the right of 
property or impairing social administration, if it is of social 
harmfulness and constitutes any crime as provided for in 
the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, it 
shall be subject to criminal liabilities. If it is not serious 
enough to be subject to a criminal punishment, it shall, in 
accordance with this law, be subject to public security 
punishment by the public security organ.
74
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 Article 384 of the CCL 1996 provides: “Any state functionary who, by taking 
advantage of his position . . . misappropriates a relatively large amount of public funds 
for profit-making . . . shall be guilty of misappropriation of public funds and shall be 
sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than five years or criminal 
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1996, The Supreme People’s Court’s Interpretation on Several Questions Concerning the 
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Interpretation on Several Questions Concerning the Concrete Application of Laws in 
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effective May. 9, 1998), available at http://www.law-
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Connection and Conflict of POAPL and CCL], 10 GONG’AN YANJIU [POLICING STUD.] 58, 
58-9, 61-2 (2007). 
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 Veron Mei-Ying Hung, Improving Human Rights in China: Should Re-
education through Labour Be Abolished?, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L 303, 308 (2003). 
73
 The People’s Republic of China on Public Order Administrative Punishment 
Law superseded the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Public Order 
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POAPL, supra note 3. 
74
 Id., art. II. 
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Yet, Chinese legal professionals seem to have reached a consensus 
that minor offence refers to behaviour conducted with minor criminal 
intention, resulting in petty socially damaging consequences.
75
 Therefore, 
such transgression is supposed to be handled outside the criminal regime, 
as it is not serious enough to warrant criminal prosecution.
76
 This legal 
categorization has led to two parallel and self-governing regulatory 
frameworks within the Chinese legal system: the criminal and 
administrative justice systems. Drug use, prostitution, and social order 
infringements are consider minor offences subject to administrative 
detention, as their social damages are less than criminal acts. This places 
prostitutes, drug addicts, and social order offenders outside the scope of 
community corrections. 
The criminal nature of China’s community correction also shows 
in the ways in which community correctional programs are carried out by 
authorities. In the institutional structure of Chinese community correction, 
local judicial and administrative organs are assigned to undertake 
correctional and educational activities.
77
 These organs work in 
collaboration with public security organs, which are responsible for the 
supervision and examination on offenders’ behaviors.78 Although the 2003 
Notice illustrates that community corrections aim to correct offenders’ 
criminal mind and misconduct and help them reenter into society, the 
actual implementation focuses more on control and punishment than 
rehabilitation and persuasion due to a wide range of realistic factors.
79
 For 
example, many community correction enforcers concede that the Chinese 
neighborhood is neither well prepared nor equipped to carry out this 
approach, given the practical conditions of most Chinese communities.
80
 
Given their heavy daily workload,
81
 community-level judicial and 
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 Wen Li, Zhongmei Shequ Jiaozheng Lilun yu Shiwu Bijiao Yanjiu [The 
Comparison Study on Theory and Practice of Community Correction Between China and 
US], 37 ZHEJIANG DAXUE XUEBAO [J. ZHEJIANG U.] 64, 68-70 (2007. 
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 WANG, supra note 53, at 297. 
81
 The duties of judicial and administrative organs at the community level 
encompass the guidance of mediation, the regulation of grassroots legal issues, the 
carrying out of legal education, the participation of public order management, and the 
social management of released criminals and administrative offenders under Baojiao 
system. WANG YONG, JICENG SIFA XINGZHENG GONGZUO SHIWU [THE OPERATIONAL 
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administrative organs are mostly incapable of mobilizing required social 
resources to organize systematic educational and correctional programs. In 
order to make their jobs easier, they tend to simply follow the existing 
working models of implementing non-custodial criminal punishments set 
out in the CCL 1996, namely bail and residential surveillance.
82
 Therefore, 
many operational similarities can be identified in the management of 
community corrections and non-custodial criminal instruments, including: 
(1) Requiring the regular attendance of offenders to report their 
correctional progress; (2) Requiring the submission of periodical reports 
on offenders’ mental and behavioral correction; (3) Restricting the range 
of certain offenders’ activities; and (4) Organizing offenders to assume 
productive labour and community service.
83
 Even though some 
educational schemes in big pilot cities, such as Shanghai and Beijing, are 
designed to meet the formality requirements of community corrections, 
they are aimed more at general legal education and vocational skills 
training than psychological and behavioral remolding.
84
 This pattern is 
more in line with the long-existing Bangjiao system in the Chinese social 
control system.
85
   
Furthermore, it is relatively common for prison police and officers 
from local police stations to largely control community corrections in 
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 WANG, supra note 53, at 98-99. 
85
 The Bangjiao system is a means of community crime prevention, which 
assists and guides those who have misbehaved. The aim of the Bangjiao program is to 
help and direct offenders by accepting them back into the community and by providing 
them with various services. This strategy encompasses a wide range of schemes that 
cover almost every prominent aspect of social capital. The routine events in the Bangjiao 
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far-reaching belief that unemployment constitutes a major source of crime production and 
recidivism, which is commensurate with the Western research findings that stable 
employment reduces the risk of recidivism. See Mok B., Community Care for Delinquent 
Youth: The Chinese Approach of Rehabilitating the Youth Offenders, 2 J. OFFENDER 
COUNSELLING, SERVS. & REHAB. 6 (1990); Laub J.H and Sampson R. J, Turning Point in 
the Life Course: Why Change Matters to the Study of Crime, 31 CRIMINOLOGY 311 
(1993). 
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many under-developed locales.
86
 Some local governments are inclined to 
deploy experienced, retired public security personnel to handle offenders 
in the community in order to relieve judicial and administrative agencies 
of the heavy burden of oversight. More importantly, this action ensures 
that placing offenders under community treatment will not cause social 
instability.
87
 These governments believe that the police’s special 
knowledge, expertise, and skills in controlling and managing offenders in 
prisons and detention centers will transfer effectively to community 
corrections.
88
 In particular, prison officers experienced in educating 
inmates using reform through labour (劳改 laogai) are considered the 
ideal enforcement staff to realize the educative purpose of community 
corrections.
89
 However, the dominance of police in community corrections 
necessarily leads to the increasing of control-oriented nature of this 
instrument and the lowering of educative and rehabilitative elements in 
implementation. Due to the far-reaching rhetoric of crime control in 
Chinese police practice, the goals of police enforcement of community 
corrections are merely to make sure that offenders will not get into trouble, 
be involved with accidents, or lose contact with authorities.
90
 The 
fundamental aspects of education and correction that requires more 
professional capability and understanding are mostly neglected. These 
working patterns reveal that community corrections in China are no more 
than a hybrid created by both western and Chinese legal contexts. More 
precisely, the Chinese authorities tend to view community corrections as 
one of the non-custodial crime control devices that rely partially on 
rehabilitation and correction to prevent further crime.
91
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89
 Reform through labour is the governmental underpinning of directing the 
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B. Institutional Deficiencies and Limits   
Currently, community corrections are widely used in the majority 
of Chinese provinces and municipalities, including both the developed and 
undeveloped localities. The operations thus vary significantly from place 
to place in accordance with different local conditions and cultural 
characteristics. Some earlier pilot cities such as Beijing and Shanghai have 
developed a set of original educational programs that fit well with their 
own community cultures and gained a wealth of experience in how to 
maximize the effects of social capital in correcting offenders.
92
 Other 
follow-up locales have borrowed the pioneers’ experiences in designing 
their own community correctional programs and are carrying them out in 
accordance with their regional advantages.
93
 Zhejiang Province, for 
example, takes advantage of its prosperous culture of private entrepreneurs 
in establishing a number of semi-commercial community agencies, 
practically implementing community corrections as the enforcement body 
in lieu of the formal legal apparatuses.
94
 However, despite the fact that the 
community corrections system has begun to play a role in the Chinese 
penal system, its practice in each locale shares some common institutional 
deficiencies and procedural limits. These weaknesses not only impact the 
balanced growth of this mechanism in China, but more importantly, 
augment the difficulty of incorporating administrative offenders into this 
system at the current stage.  
1. The Conflict with the Hukou System 
The Hukou ( 户 口 ) household registration system was first 
implemented in Chinese cities in 1951, with the officially stated purpose 
of maintaining social peace and order, safeguarding the people’s security, 
and protecting their freedom of residence and movement.
95
 Having been in 
place in China for more than half century, the Hukou system has affected 
many fundamental aspects of life for hundreds of millions of Chinese
96
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Beijing and Shanghai, see WANG, supra note 53, at 96-112. 
93
 Id., at 112-19 (2008). 
94
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and is also intrinsically related to China’s economic development over the 
last six decades.
97
 All Chinese nationals’ personal Hukou are classified as 
either urban (non-agricultural) or rural (agricultural), which pertain to 
urban and rural population respectively. Each individual is required to 
register one and only one place of residence.
98
 For urban residents, the unit 
of registration is a household, while the unit of registration for rural people 
can be commune, village, or state farm.
99
 Only through proper government 
authorization, the Hukou conversion process, can one permanently change 
his Hukou location or his categorization from rural type to the urban.
100
 
The criteria for obtaining rural-urban migration (农转非 nongzhuanfei), 
however, are very high, and only a very selective group could possibly 
qualify.
101
 The conditions are usually stipulated by local governments to 
meet the needs of the locales.
102
 It is observed that many local 
governments have taken advantage of this discretion by “selling” local 
Hukou as a way of raising revenue.
103
 Many scholars, both inside and 
outside China, argue that the Hukou system is a major source of injustice 
and inequality because it renders millions of rural residents second-class 
citizens by depriving them of the right to mobility and access to state-
sponsored benefits.
 104
  Nevertheless, some of them concede that “this 
omnipresent and powerful, albeit adapted and adjusted, system is alive and 
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well,” despite a variety of reforms instituted to it by the Chinese 
government.
105
 
A general consensus among both legal and sociological scholars is 
that the Hukou system has long served as an important mechanism in 
distributing resources and determining life chances in China.
106
 The 
designation of non-agricultural status entitles the bearer to enjoy the state-
provided welfare, including permanent employment, medical insurance, 
housing, pensions, and educational opportunities for children.
107
 
Agricultural status, however, denies residents access to most state benefits, 
in particular urban community and social resources.
108
 Many professionals 
therefore point out that “the Hukou system possesses the discriminatory 
features against the rural population and places temporary rural migrants 
in a disadvantaged position in social and economic terms.”109  
Although community corrections regulations do not illustrate 
eligibility in terms of offenders’ Hukou and residential status, most pilot 
cities and provinces choose only to receive offenders who have the local 
Hukou and residential location in the consideration of effective 
management. Beijing, for example, specifically instructs that community 
correctional programs are only available to criminal offenders who hold 
Beijing Hukou, and non-Beijing Hukou offenders should return to their 
registered residences for serving their community sentences.
110
 Likewise, 
Hunan Province expressly states that those who are eligible to be placed 
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under community correction must have Hunan Hukou or have resided in 
Hunan permanently or for a long period of time.
111
  
Indeed, as far as the implementation of community corrections is 
concerned, determining the offender’s eligibility standard according to 
Hukou status is of benefit to the smooth practice of this instrument. This is 
because those with local Hukou are considered convenient to manage and 
controllable due to their life-long familial and social ties in the local 
neighborhood. Meanwhile, given the limited resources of local 
governments, it is understandable that local Hukou offenders would be 
favored to receive community corrections prior to migrants or temporary 
residents from outside regions. This entry standard, however, creates 
another critical obstacle to placing administrative offenders in the 
community corrections system, particularly in some modern and big cities 
where community correctional schemes are properly developed and 
operated. Much evidence shows that prescribed administrative perpetrators 
in China, namely prostitutes, drug addicts, and social-order breakers, are 
mostly “floating population” that lack local Hukou. 112  This “floating 
population” largely moves from the countryside to the city, from 
underdeveloped economic areas to developed areas, and from the central 
and western regions to the eastern coastal region. 
Since 1978, economic reform has encouraged large-scale 
population mobility nationwide.
113
 With under-employment in the rural 
labour force, farmers have been motivated to seek jobs outside the 
agricultural sector.
114
 The enormous number of agricultural workers that 
have moved to cities and towns has created a new migrant class, rural 
labourers ( 农 民 工  nongmingong), pursuing better employment 
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opportunities and fortunes in the urban communities.
115
 Geographically, 
the coastal regions (i.e.., Guangdong Province), municipalities (i.e., 
Beijing and Shanghai) and capitals of provinces (i.e., Chengdu and 
Shenyang) have become the welcomed areas for the migration of rural 
workers.
116
 However, Hukou status represents a critical predictor of labuor 
market outcomes. Many studies reveal that rural labourers with 
agricultural Hukou have diminished chances of holding a job in the state 
sector and are more likely to be self-employed or experiencing 
unemployment spells.
117
 Even if they are temporarily employed, they 
normally undertake heavy and cheap labour work as their daily job, such 
as those in the field of house construction, sales, cleaning, or other 
infrastructural works.
118
 It is in part because rural labourers acquire lower-
level education attainment than their urban counterparts.
119
 More 
importantly, the lack of advanced skills and human capital produces the 
major impediment to the advancement of rural labourers in the urban 
labour market.    
The difficulty of finding stable, well-paying employment, coupled 
with the tension resulting from increasing urban-rural income inequality, 
contribute heavily to commission of administrative offences and crimes by 
rural labourers in China. It is documented that many female rural 
labourers, motivated by the need to find employment, choose to sell sex to 
earn money in cities.
120
 For example, a statistical survey conducted in a 
Chinese medium-size city shows that more than fifty percent of prostitutes 
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are migrants and temporary residents from the inland provinces.
121
 The 
situation is even worse in large cities. According to one research study on 
the crime committed by the floating population in Shanghai, more than 
seventy-one percent of prostitutes are rural women.
122
 The regions 
prostitutes come from are poor, overpopulated, or remote and 
mountainous, such as Sichuan and Hunan.
123
 Therefore, they either suffer 
individually from economic difficulty or come from very poor families.
124
 
Most prostitutes have either only completed middle school or dropped out 
of school in their adolescence.
125
 These characterizations make them a far 
cry from the local criteria for rural-to urban migration Hukou conversion, 
despite the fact that they might have long-resided in cities and towns.  
Although there is no official record of a link between drug abuse 
and prostitution in China, many general features are shared by drug 
addicts and prostitutes in terms of their social and behavioral profiles. 
Beginning in the early 1990s, drug abuse spread rapidly in China.
126
 The 
number of registered drug abusers increased from 70,000 in 1990 to more 
than three million by the end of 2006,
127
 covering 72.7 percent of Chinese 
counties/cities.
128
 The real number is undoubtedly far greater than the 
statistics report. Unlike the pre-reform period, most drug users in 
contemporary China are of the younger generation, with low educational 
levels and limited job skills.
129
 The vast majority of surveyed drug abusers 
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remain jobless for lengthy periods.
130
 Lengthy unemployment makes their 
life vacuous, boring, and lonely, discouraging them from starting a normal 
life and tempting them to use drugs for the pursuit of ecstasy and 
excitement.
131
 Educational status of drug users determines the likelihood 
of drug abuse. Different evaluations seem to show an identical finding that, 
in general, more than three-quarter of drug addicts are only preliminary or 
middle school graduates.
132
 More notably, most detained drug abusers in 
cities are rural labour workers with low wages.
133
 Prior to being detained 
in compulsory rehabilitation, they have never had legal and scientific 
education with respect to the dangerousness of drugs, nor have they 
received guidance on how to avoid possible drug interactions.
134
 One 
statistical study conducted in Beijing in 2007 in which 598 samples 
collected, 64.7 percent of drug users are rural labourers with low 
education attainment, whereas only 35.3 percent are urban residents 
holding local Beijing Hukou.
135
  
Apart from drug abusers and prostitutes, public order offenders 
handled under the POAPL constitute the rest of administrative offenders. 
A review of the literature indicates that very few previous statistical 
studies have been done dealing specifically with public order 
transgressions by rural labourers or their background variables.
136
 Yet, 
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some scholars unanimously claim that the high rates of public order 
offences in cities can be attributed to the large number of rural labourers 
who do not possess adequate labour skills, struggle to find stable jobs, and 
fail to adjust to urban living and social environments.
137
 
This hypothesis is supported by a survey undertaken on the issue 
of crime committed by the floating population in Beijing.
138
 This research 
focuses on the behavioral and social characteristics of rural migrants who 
committed crime in Beijing during the period of 1996-2005. The study 
tends to rely on the empirical and statistical analysis to explore the deeper 
socio-legal factors that trigger migrants’ intention of criminality. The 
findings of this study show that the percentage of the floating population 
committing crimes had been ascending since the mid-1990s, reaching the 
pinnacle of sixty one percent in 2005.
139
 Most criminals held agricultural 
Hukou, and had remained either unemployed or transiently employed 
since they migrated to Beijing.
140
 Although the report does not provide the 
precise percentage of floaters who were involved in public order offences, 
it states that the number of rural labourers detained for public order 
transgressions is way higher than the number of those detained for 
criminal activities and other local public order breakers who had the 
Beijing Hukou. 
 
Table 1: Statistical Summary of Administrative Offences and Crimes Committed by 
Floating People in Beijing  
  
 
 
1996 (Year) 2005 (Year) Increasing Rate 
Administrative 
Offences 
9725 (Person) 47648 (Person) 4.9 
Committed Crimes 8025 (Person) 17104 (Person) 2.1 
Source: Wang, Cai, Zhang & Guo (2007) p.10.  
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Akin to prostitutes and drug abusers, rural public order offenders 
serve largely as a surplus labour force, who are the least likely to be hired 
in the urban labour market due to lack of education and skill.
141
 It is not 
uncommon that education attainment with this group is low, usually only 
primary and middle school level.
142
 Before migrating to cities, most rural 
workers do not have adequate opportunities for systematic legal and moral 
education and occupation training during schooling.
143
  As a result, the 
majority possess a low level of of occupational skills and legal 
consciousness, which most likely leads to unlawfully harmful conduct 
when their adaption to the novel urban environment encounters challenges. 
Meanwhile, due to the rapid development of urbanization, the floaters’ 
rural traditions and behavioral patterns are no longer compatible with city 
lifestyles, social networking, cultural surroundings, and management 
system. The inconsistency thus creates exterior factors that exacerbate the 
instability and frustration of rural population in the new environment, 
increasing the likelihood of them committing minor offences such as 
shoplifting, gambling, and fighting when they are psychologically and 
financially pressured.
144
  
2. Inapplicability of Community Corrections in Rural Society 
Clearly, the above description of China’s administrative offenders 
reduces the possibility of placing most prostitutes, drug abusers, and 
public order breakers under the urban community correction system. The 
current practice is most likely to send floating offenders back to their 
hometowns for treatment, in an attempt to preserve limited community 
resources for urban citizens. However, as community correction in China 
has a very short history and relies heavily on community resources in 
implementation, it gives rise to the concern that the most rural 
communities in contemporary China may not be capable of handling 
returned offenders properly in the context of its unique cultural and 
traditional environments. 
Compared to the advantages of financial and resource supports in 
promoting educational programs in the urban communities, the rural 
community is usually ill-developed and equipped with fewer social forces 
in its implementation. As such, the rural regions that take up eighty 
percent of the country’s territory are barely covered by the operational 
framework of community corrections, which is most likely to leave rural 
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offenders uncared for and unsupervised when they are forced to return 
back to their registered residences.  
Although the implementation of community correction has been 
greatly encouraged by the government since its commencement in 2003, 
its use, in practice, has been largely limited to cities and towns where 
social and human resources are sufficient to bolster the execution of 
correctional programs. Shanghai, for example, has shaped a relatively 
sophisticated community correction system. Its rapid success, however, 
derives from its well-structured and organized working model, in which a 
government-financed service station is deployed to mainly carry out 
correctional programs in collaboration with community volunteers.
145
 This 
community-based semi-commercial incorporation has a large number of 
well-trained social workers, who actively undertake correctional programs 
by offering their professional and specialized services.
146
 These 
community workers are recruited by the service station, but largely paid 
by the government.
147
 It thus raises the question of whether this centrally-
planned model is workable in China’s rural community.  
In fact, while the urban community is often fostered in perfecting 
the effectiveness of correctional schemes by strong government support, 
many rural communities have difficulty formally initiating this mechanism. 
The reasons are multifaceted. First, rural community corrections suffer 
significantly from the lack of human resources, including professional 
workers and law enforcement personnel.
148
 Article 9 of the Provisional 
Measure of Judicial and Administrative Organs in Administering 
Community Correction Work states that local administrative and justice 
offices are responsible for the implementation of community corrections 
in rural towns and villages.
149
 But, in actuality, most Chinese rural 
administrative and justice departments are only armed with a small 
number of government-employed administrative staff together with some 
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part-time social workers.
150
 Apart from the exercise of community 
correction, they are required to undertake considerable legal service 
activities and neighboring mediation everyday.
151
 Fengqiao town, the first 
village to experiment community corrections in China’s rural society, has 
drawn scholarly attention and illustrated this dilemma. Despite the 
successful implementation of correctional programs based on the system 
of autonomous regulation,
152
 only two officially employed justice workers 
and fourteen casual officers are assigned to specifically carry out 
community corrections in this village.
153
 Faced by more than thirty 
community correction targets in this spacious neighborhood, they are often 
frustrated with the helpless situation in which they find it impossible to 
keep up with daily management and time-consuming educational 
activities.
154
  
Secondly, scarce funds to perform correctional programs greatly 
discourage this tool from being widely used in China’s countryside. As a 
new and experimental instrument of administering justice, the cost of 
implementing community corrections has not yet been officially included 
in the governments’ systematic budgets. 155  Therefore, the practice of 
educational programs in China’s designated locales are mostly financed by 
temporary and residual funds allocated by the local Justice of Bureau (司
法局 sifaju).156 The distribution of capital, however, is discretionary and 
random in light of the varied needs of implementation.
157
 If the authorities 
are willing to reserve some amount of money for urban community 
corrections, given the sound city infrastructures and facilities, rural towns 
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and villages are basically treated as the abandoned sectors that are given 
very little attention to its development of community corrections. This 
shows in the fact that many rural towns do not have separate and furnished 
offices for community workers to carry out their legal duties.
158
 The grass-
roots officials are usually not equipped with the same uniform, working 
license, or relevant identification or badges for undertaking community 
corrections.
159
 This phenomenon is not unique. Although China has sought 
to promote the rural society economically and politically over last few 
decades,
160
 a strong urban-biased development policy through various 
implicit and explicit transfer programs has overridden the entire process of 
China’s economic and social transformation.161 This trend remains strong 
today.
162
 Over time, the rural-urban divide is increasing, including the 
worsening inequality in income, which is widening regional disparities 
and allowing less access to state resources by rural people.
163
 In particular, 
most rural areas in west China are still struggling to fight poverty. The 
statistics specify that the total population under the poverty-line in China’s 
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western rural areas is 65.1 percent.
164
 They are not only economically poor, 
but also poor in cultural and social services. According to a research study 
conducted in 637 western counties in 2000, about 18.3 percent of the total 
communities cannot connect to the outside by roads, 16.5 percent do not 
electricity, 56.5 percent do not have tap water and 57 percent have no 
telephone equipment to use.
165
                  
As demonstrated above, a large part of migrated minor offenders 
are believed to be originally from China’s poorest prefectures. Handling 
them in their registered communities will certainly create a huge financial 
burden on their local rural economy. The rural society will have to upgrade 
community facilities and resources to meet the needs of implementing 
community corrections. Operationally, local justice departments will have 
to increase their recruitment budgets to employ many professional workers 
and well-trained implementers in order to practically initiate correctional 
programs. This difficulty further explains the lack of enthusiasm of 
authorities for spreading community corrections in the countryside and 
appropriating already limited money towards programs. In effect, when 
many rural villages still lack basic supplies and have residents living in 
poverty, it is an extravagant hope to expect them to take on extra 
demanding legal and social duties of executing community corrections. 
Therefore, returning migrant offenders back to their Hukou residences 
essentially means putting them back in society without any social 
treatment, which will not be beneficial to their correction and re-
socialization but instead poses a predictable threat to the stability of their 
rural neighborhoods.  
Thirdly, the cultural and environmental contexts in contemporary 
rural China are likely to serve as the main hindrances to the successful 
implanting of community corrections in the countryside. It is clear that the 
modern Chinese rural sector can no longer be referred to as an agricultural 
society merely bound by blood and familial ties, functioning based on 
family unit with a simple communal structure.
166
 Since the late 1970s, 
China’s economic reforms have dramatically impacted the social, 
economic and political aspects of the rural regime.
167
 In particular, 
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industrialization, urbanization, and transformation from the collective 
system to the household-responsibility system have created a dynamic and 
multi-cultural rural world.
168
 This new world has gradually shaped a new 
social stratification and a multi-level structure of ownership.
169
 
Despite the spectacular developments of China’s rural sector at the 
economic and social level, however, some far-reaching ideological roots 
have remained intact. Having been influenced by the Confucian ideals for 
thousands of years, rural society in China functions based more on 
customary standards and traditional moral values than law.
170
 Some 
experts point out that if the order and system of China’s urban society is 
theoretically ruled by law, then the rural society is mostly regulated by 
virtue, morality, and tribal rules that have long been the foundations of 
Confucian traditions.
171
 As traditional customs work more effectively than 
law in rural China, peasants adopt a plain version of standards to discern 
“good and bad” and deeply believe that “bad people” should be severely 
punished to serve the purposes of retribution and deterrence.
172
  
Such a philosophy is clearly inconsistent with the spirit of 
community corrections. As a newly adopted means of administering 
justice in the Chinese penal framework, community corrections advocate 
education, rehabilitation and rescuing. It emphasizes remolding offenders 
in order to help them reintegrate into society rather than punishing them to 
serve the goal of crime control. Therefore, the exercise of this tool requires 
a relaxing and forgiving environment, as well as participants who possess 
high levels of legal understanding and consciousness so that they may 
appreciate the significance of this social treatment. Yet, the current state of 
rural education indicates that the number of well-educated people in 
China’s rural population is comparatively low, and fewer people have 
received formal, quality legal education. It is true that, along with rural 
reforms initiated in 1978, China has made great progress in building the 
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rural educational system, such as the establishment and enforcement of 
nine-year compulsory education in the countryside.
173
 However, the 
availability and affordability of educational attainment have always been 
challenged by rural poverty and low educational investment.
174
 Some 
specialists argue that provincial and county economic indicators were 
closely linked to educational investments, per-pupil spending and school 
availability.
175
 Since the late 1980s, market reforms intensified the relative 
economic disadvantage of more rural, interior provinces, and 
interprovincial income inequality increased markedly through the 
1990s.
176
 Experts claim that “for many poor rural areas, the lack of local 
government revenues or subsidies from upper levels of government 
precluded local governments from meeting salary obligations to teachers 
and from providing a high-quality education system.”177 As a result, low 
literacy levels in rural China are still appalling. A Chinese publication 
illustrates that in the total employed rural population in 2004, 35.9 percent 
are illiterate or semi-illiterate and 37.2 percent have only completed 
primary school.
178
  
Interestingly, apart from basic scientific education, China has long 
propagated public legal education.
179
 In an attempt to consolidate the 
building of a socialist legal system, China has launched a wide-scale legal 
education campaign after the smashing of “Gang of Four.”180 Both urban 
and rural communities are required to carry out universal legal education 
to strengthen their residents’ legal consciousness and improve their grasp 
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of legal knowledge.
181
 Given that China is a rurally-dominated country, 
the authorities have long paid special attention to the enforcement of legal 
education in rural society.
182
 Over last few decades, a series of effective 
measures have been adapted to strengthen rural legal education, ranging 
from distribution and explanation of teaching materials to the organization 
of legal seminars, which study practical cases related to peasant 
production and life.
183
 Nevertheless, as discussed above, if the 
institutionalization of fundamental education in rural China is 
encountering considerable obstacles, then legal education seems unlikely 
to succeed in raising legal awareness of rural inhabitants as expected. 
Naturally, legal education in rural China is still a central policy without 
legislative or regulative grounds.
184
 To maintain the basic operation of 
grass-roots facilities, many rural governments have to carefully consider 
how to efficiently allocate their tight budgets. Therefore, most villages and 
towns, especially in some interior and poor locales, are afforded minimal 
and spontaneous funds to undertake legal educational activities.
185
 With 
legal study organized occasionally and irregularly, rural legal officials 
have gradually shaped an indifferent and careless attitude to carrying out 
their assigned obligations.
186
  
Furthermore, strongly influenced by the ideology of “rule of 
person,” Chinese rural society maintains an informal social control system 
built upon social ties and clan’s interferences. When involved in legal 
issues and disputes, peasants are more inclined to rely on social networks 
to solve the problem than formal legal procedures.
187
 It is in part because 
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they concerned that bringing a legal action may be too time-consuming 
and troublesome, and the result is usually unsatisfactory.
188
 More 
importantly, the deep-rooted system of informal, socially-enforced control 
causes rural residents to seek and trust help from unofficial controlling 
groups or individuals, who possess dominant power in the management of 
local affairs, such as clan leaders and village cadres,.
189
 In a word, the 
scholarly community has reached a general consensus that the universality 
of poverty, the lack of an operational mechanism and the villagers’ 
negative attitude towards participation of legal study serve as three biggest 
factors hindering legal education in contemporary rural China.
190
 
From the economic, social, and cultural perspectives, the current 
Chinese rural community is not nearly capable of incorporating 
administrative offenders into its social treatment system. Labour mobility, 
rural poverty, and low literacy brought about by rapid urbanization and 
economic reform have made most rural regions socially dysfunctional. 
Furthermore, the economic dependence of these communities to the cities 
has created significant social and regional disparities between rural and 
urban sectors.
191
 Uneven economic growth has led to the deployment and 
distribution of most social and human resources for the benefit of urban 
developments.
192
 In the meantime, rural residents are qualitatively 
excluded the access to economic and social opportunities, activities and 
benefits. Such inequality directly results in inadequacies of infrastructural 
facilities and resources in rural surroundings, thus leaving the rural 
community unprepared for returned administrative offenders. Moreover, 
low educational attainment does not allow rural residents and officials to 
correctly face and properly handle the physical and psychological 
characteristics of minor offenders.  
Compared to urban social and legal workers, who are 
professionally trained and have acquired relevant socio-legal knowledge, 
the rural society requires most rural legal personnel to engage more in 
handling trivial legal disputes and implementation of superior 
directions.
193
 As a result, rural social workers lack the resources and 
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channels from which they may learn and acquire skills to work positively 
and cooperatively with offenders in order to stimulate, actively engage, 
and educate them at different levels. 
 
C. Social Rejection and Discrimination 
 
Another major obstacle of incorporating administrative offenders 
into the community lies in the rejection, discrimination, and fear of the 
general public against socially and morally harmful behaviours. In 
contemporary China, the public attitude towards drug use and prostitution 
is discriminatory and hostile.
194
 Drug abusers and prostitutes are often 
deserted by their families and friends.
195
 Even after ending their drug use 
and prostitution, they are still rejected and looked down upon by the 
community—a situation that might lead to relapse.196 Thus, it is important 
to examine the social cognition framework of administrative offences in 
China. Based on much relevant empirical evidence, it has become clear 
that the general public attitudes have become the ideological barrier to the 
social handling of administrative offenders.      
In contemporary Chinese society, drug addiction is widely 
characterized as a misdemeanour rather than a crime.
197
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from the perspective of the public, is an unethical form of behaviour that 
contradicts social values and morality. Rather than gaining sympathy, drug 
addicts more frequently face great hostility from the community and even 
their own families and friends.
198
 One study conducted in Gansu Province 
shows that ninety two percent of residents feel very unsafe around drug 
addicts and are unwilling to make contact with them due to the fear of 
potential risk of contracting HIV/AIDS-related illnesses.
199
 Indeed, many 
clinical researches both within and outside China demonstrate that drug 
addiction, especially injection drug use, accounts for the HIV/AIDS 
infection and even epidemics in some areas.
200
 Although these diseases are 
transmitted through certain specific paths, the Chinese public in general is 
frightened of the “high” contagiousness of HIV/AIDS due to its low level 
of medical knowledge and education.
201
 A study regarding the social 
cognition of HIV/AIDS patients indicates that regardless of social class, 
the majority of Chinese people have failed to acquire correct information 
about HIV/AIDS and show fearful, abandoning, and discriminatory 
attitudes towards HIV/AIDS patients. For example, 42.3 percent of 
medical teachers in a Guangdong province medical school perceived that 
HIV virus can be contagious by simply sharing swimming pools, public 
toilet seats, and mosquito bites.
202
 Likewise, only 21.28 percent of 
students in one of the universities located in Hunan Province believed that 
kissing, coughing, and sharing utensils will not cause the transmission of 
HIV/AIDS.
203
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In addition to stigma stemming from perceived danger surrounding 
disease, drug addicts in China are usually considered a group, which 
represents moral degradation, physical laziness, and mental 
vacuousness.
204
 The Gansu-based study reveals that almost one hundred 
percent of community residents are reluctant to build deep and long-term 
relationships with drug abusers, such as loaning them money, creating 
romantic relationships, or getting married to them.
205
  
These popular attitudes are further reflected in the relapse of drug 
abuse. Statistical surveys observe that the recidivism of drug addicts is 
appalling in China. One recent report illustrates that an estimated sixty to 
ninety five percent of detoxified patients in China relapse within one 
year.
206
 Most recidivists went through compulsory detoxification 
treatments in either a compulsory drug rehabilitiation centre or a 
reeducation through labour camp,
207
 but neither exerts a positive effect on 
the eradication of drug addiction.
208
 By exploring the psychobiological 
and mental roots of drug recidivism, many scholars argue that the 
inadequacy of social and familial attention and care increases the risk of 
relapse.
209
 According to studies on the personality characteristics of 
different types of detoxified drug re-abusers, emotional disregard toward 
drug addicts is the factor most likely to induce mental depression and 
anxiety and result in a lack of confidence and pessimistic attitude. This, in 
turn, pushes the detoxified drug users back into drug abuse for relief from 
mental discomfort.
210
 
The public holds some similar attitudes towards prostitution. It is 
important to note that the expeditious economic growth in China has 
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significantly affected this country’s social ideology and culture.211 As part 
of the economic transformation, many people have accepted that “to be 
rich is glorious” and place making money as their highest priority. 212 
Meanwhile, an increasingly small group of upper-income earners now 
control a staggeringly large portion of China’s wealth, while many citizens, 
especially rural people, live in poverty and hunger.
213
 This has led to 
divided feelings in the public about women who provide sexual services. 
On one hand, some people recognize the necessity of prostitution in a 
modern society
214
 and justify it as women’s right to trade their own body 
for money in an effort to get rid of poverty, acquire resources for their 
future, and realize gender equality.
215
 On the other hand, popular culture 
still portrays prostitutes as women who sell their souls for “dirty money,” 
if they are not forced into prostitution.
216
 A study designed to collect 
public attitudes toward prostitution in Wuhan City demonstrates this 
mainstream view. In this report, 91.3 percent of 159 interviewed residents 
characterize prostitution as a morally-unacceptable behavior.
217
 Eighty 
seven percent of residents objected to proposals to decriminalize 
prostitution and establish red light district by arguing that the legalization 
of prostitution will exacerbate declining moral and social values.
218
  
The negative feedback on prostitution is also attributed to the 
concern over the potential contagiousness of sexually transmitted diseases. 
As sex workers in China are mostly from interior and ill-developed areas 
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where fundamental education is lacking, most of them have little 
knowledge of HIV/AIDS and their forms of transmission.
219
 As a result, 
their widespread and unprotected sexual activities cause the spread of HIV 
in China. In one study of 701 prostitutes from a Shenzhen reeducation 
through labour centre, ten percent had never heard about AIDS, 21.7 
percent perceived that AIDS is a disease confined to the homosexual 
population, and approximately thirty-five percent believed that AIDS is 
completely curable.
220
 Misconceptions about HIV infection determine the 
frequency of using condom by prostitutes.
221
 Many relevant studies 
observe that condom use by Chinese sex workers is irregular and random, 
depending typically on the willingness of customers.
222
 For example, a 
qualitative study carried out on commercial sex workers in Ji’nan city 
indicates that only fifty percent out of 158 prostitutes used condoms 
frequently, while about twenty seven percent barely or never used condom 
during their sex services.
223
 Furthermore, research findings articulate that 
prostitution and drug use are always closely tied.
224
 A large number of 
prostitutes are also drug addicts, abusing substance due mainly to their 
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sense of curiosity, negative self-concept and psychological paralysis.
225
 A 
survey undertaken to study HIV infection of prostitutes in Hainan 
Province reveals that in 593 rehabilitated female sex workers, 98.2 percent 
sold sex to earn money to purchase drugs.
226
  
Compared to the highly negative social responses toward drug 
abusers and prostitutes, the general attitudes toward public order offenders 
are relatively mild. This is because public order breakers in China commit 
transgressions that are not serious enough to be criminalized. In response 
to their misconduct, only a short-term incarceration for a maximum period 
of twenty days is imposed on the most “severe” offenders.227 Moreover, 
minor wrongdoers break the law due mainly to their intuitive-impulsive 
consciousness or certain unexpected sporadic incidents.
228
 Most of them 
are later found to express shame and remorse for their past conduct and 
long for social forgiveness and acceptance.
229
  
However, with enormous migration waves from rural areas to 
urban territories over last decades, the continuously increasing rates of 
public order offence have raised public concern over the issue of social 
security. A fieldwork study conducted in Beijing, Chongqin, and 
Guangzhou in 2000 shows that approximately seventy six percent of 
people considered conditions of social safety and order either average or 
poor.
230
 In terms of urban residents in particular, the finding reveals that 
the coefficient of sense of social security has dramatically dropped during 
the period of 1988-1998.
231
 More specifically, around forty percent of 
interviewed residents or their relatives were reportedly victims of a crime 
or public order offence, and 23.2 percent witnessed the occurrence of a 
crime or a minor offence in their life.
232
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As demonstrated earlier, inflowing rural labourers have contributed 
statistically to social unease in the form of committing crime and violating 
social order. As such, they are frequently portrayed negatively in the 
media and perceived as a direct threat to social stability.
233
 In effect, there 
is a tendency in some modern and large Chinese cities for local residents 
to blindly and willfully blame rural migrants for the worsening of public 
order and safety.
234
 To show their unwelcoming attitude, local residents 
have begun to make migrant workers experience unpleasant social 
encounters, such as verbal disrespect or deliberate avoidance.
235
 However, 
the discrimination, social isolation, and unjust treatment by urban 
residents in turn enhance rural migrants’ sensitivity, desperation, and 
helplessness in the urban communities.
236
 They are more inclined to 
develop an antagonistic mentality against the social surroundings, being 
easily irritated and provoked to engage in serious public order offences, 
such as street fighting and public property damage.
237
       
Not surprisingly, the behavioral patterns and socio-cultural 
attributes of drug abusers, prostitutes, and public order offenders produce 
the greatest social hindrance to achieving the proposed community 
socialization. It is most likely that local residents, especially urban 
inhabitants, would object to accept alien individuals and groups in their 
neighboring system to maintain purity and integrity of the community. 
Such opposition, however, is not totally unpredictable. Many legal 
practitioners have observed that effective implementation of current 
community corrections in China is challenged by a great deal of 
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ideological impediments from the public and community residents in 
particular.
238
 
Although the use of community correctional programs are now 
widespread in China’s three-tier institutional structure (city, district, and 
town), its enforcement is actually more order-driven than socially-needed.  
The prevailing rhetoric of criminality among Chinese ordinary citizens 
favors harsh punishment and lengthy incarceration.
239
 From the 
perspectives of criminology and victimology, most people are concerned 
that they could become victims if criminals are not heavily penalized and 
imprisoned to realize the ultimate goals of retribution and deterrence.
240
 
This mentality is partially derived from the strong penal emphasis of the 
imperial law.
241
 A common feature shared by penal codes of many ancient 
dynasties was the stipulation of harsh and precise punishments.
242
 A 
system of brutal and inhuman punishments was extensively used in 
China’s ancient times.243 Many corporal punishments and death penalties 
were carried out publicly, aiming at educating and deterring the general 
public into obedience and allegiance with the government.
244
  
Although the socialist justice system has incorporated and 
gradually emphasized the elements of re-education and rehabilitation of 
offenders in its practice,
245
 the principle of severe punishment (重刑主义 
zhongxing zhuyi) has not been eliminated. Instead, this principle has been  
reinforced in the Hard Strike compaigns since the 1980s. The Hard Strike 
campaigns were intermittent activities initiated by the government to stop 
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crime waves by swiftly and severely punishing serious criminals.
246
 
Research into three large-scale rounds of severe strikes that were launched 
in 1983, 1996, and 2001 revealed that a wide range of specific crimes and 
administrative offences were speedily and harshly handled in those 
campaigns, in line with the political needs of each different phase.
247
 
During these crackdowns, criminals were punished more severely than the 
penalties stipulated by the criminal laws.
248
 Statistical surveys show that 
death sentences and executions in such anti-crime campaigns were 
prevalent.
249
 At the same time, substantially stiffer fixed-term sentences 
were imposed on those who had committed administrative offences.
250
 
According to one of Chinese law experts, the aim of Hard Strike is “to 
procure a reduction in the crime rate and to restore social order.” 251  This 
goal “is to be achieved both by a policy of ‘severity and swiftness’ in 
processing criminals in the judicial system and by uniting the work of the 
three arms of the criminal justice system—the public security bureau, the 
procuratorate and the courts—in an all-out attack on offenders who 
endanger the social order.”252 As a result, the public has begun to attribute 
the recent deterioration of public order simply to light punishment and 
discontinuation of the Hard Strike movement.
253
 A reliance on grave 
punishment to solve the rising crimes and public order issues has now 
been deeply rooted in the Chinese society.
254
  
The public preference of adopting a disciplinary and punitive 
society undoubtedly contradicts the ideological and constitutive nature of 
community corrections. Many residents address their concern that placing 
offenders under community treatment is too lenient to penalize their 
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criminality.
255
 They are worried that the use of community corrections 
represents benevolence and kindness that will impinge on the authority 
and justice of law, hence giving offenders the second chance to commit 
further crimes.
256
 In addition, the extreme hatred, contempt, and avoidance 
of offenders enables the general public to believe that criminals deserve 
abandonment and humiliation rather than care and help. Many 
discontented residents further argue that the sharing of social resources by 
community corrections offenders is inappropriate and rather unfair to other 
law-abiding citizens.
257
 Clearly, social rejection and repulsion have had a 
chilling effect on re-socialization of offenders in China. Many offenders 
are sensitive to, or even ashamed of their identity as a law-breaker in the 
ways that they refuse to participate in legal education and community 
services and to accept social workers’ visits258  Over-suspicion and self-
abandonment are also found in the psychological assessment of a 
substantial number of offenders.
259
 On one hand, offenders care about how 
families and friends think of them, and are easily affected by the negative 
responses by them. On the other hand, they fear to face their families and 
friends, and would rather stay alone to spare the foreseeable 
embarrassment. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Reforming China’s administrative justice system is never limited in 
the legal sense. Although much literature has been introduced on how to 
rationalize or eliminate this legal scheme, the strong correlations of this 
system with socio-cultural contexts are largely overlooked. More 
specifically, Chinese prostitutes, drug abusers, and public order offenders, 
at the behavioural and psychological level, are more like a socially 
marginalized population excluded from the mainstream social culture than 
pure criminals. The desire to effectively remould and successfully help 
them integrate into conventional society should always outweigh the 
pursuit of justifying a corrupt legal system, which stresses compliance 
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with the rule of law principle with little regard to the practical 
effectiveness on preventing reoffending. 
Indeed, from the correctional and educational perspectives, 
community corrections that abound with positive social factors and rich 
social resources may serve as a better substitute to the current 
administrative justice system. But the reality reveals that the practical 
operation of community corrections in the context of Chinese legal, 
economic, and social culture can hardly achieve this ultimate goal as 
planned, at least in a short run. 
Other than the shaky legal foundations of the Chinese community 
corrections system, the most alarming factors in the practice of this 
instrument spring from institutional and social aspects. Foremost, the 
genuinely widespread use of community corrections will not be realizable 
without the eradication of social and spatial stratification, as well as rural-
urban inequalities. More precisely, the Hukou system that divides Chinese 
people into two different categories—“the haves” and “the have-nots”—
has formed an invisible wall, which limits most administrative offenders’ 
access to the services of community corrections. While a small number of 
urban offenders may be placed under community treatment, the substantial 
population of rural offenders are most likely to be left unsupervised and 
uncared for, due to the lack of the effective community correctional 
mechanisms in rural communities. In addition, social rejection and 
avoidance generates an environment where community corrections are 
functionally misunderstood and locally repulsed. Such general attitudes 
encompass not only the negative perception towards behaviours and 
individuals that endanger social order and morality, but also feelings of 
superiority and resentment felt by urban people towards the rural 
population, who are viewed as the potential lawbreakers and a drain on 
urban community resources.    
 
 
 
  
